TBTM20080612


The dangers of Obamania: “like Reagan before him, Barack Obama is having a narcotic effect on the American psyche, dulling their lived awareness of the Iraq débâcle and reducing the Bush presidency to a mere aberration. His strident opposition to the war efforts in Iraq coupled with the deliberately pandering message of utopian immediacy—‘We are the change we seek’ and ‘We are the ones we’ve been waiting for’—are invitations to the American people to enclose themselves once again in their solipsistic cocoon, and to resume their idiotic obsession with the drama of their national life.”

So that’s where they stand

“I’ve been a strong supporter of ethanol,” Obama said.

“Those ethanol subsidies should be phased out, and everybody here on this stage, if it wasn’t for the fact that Iowa is the first caucus state, would share my view that we don’t need ethanol subsidies. It doesn’t help anybody,” McCain said.

Just for interest: a position where the traditionally conservative position (no government intervention) is also the most explicitly pro-social justice position, which is traditionally seen as left wing…

Just one of the reasons why I am a conservative.

A very silly futurist article

Whilst writing that last post, I came across this article – “Why the US will still be the only superpower in 2030” – which is a good example of a) shallow US triumphalism, and b) a remarkable disconnection from reality. I thought I’d write a commentary on it. My remarks in red italics after each paragraph of the original.

To match the US by 2030, China would have to :

1) Have an economy near the size of the US economy. If the US grows by 3.5% a year for the next 25 years, it will be $30 trillion in 2006 dollars by then. Note that this is a modest assumption for the US, given the accelerating nature of economic growth, but also note that world GDP only grows about 4% a year, and this might at most be 5% a year by 2030. China, with an economy of $2.2 trillion in nominal (not PPP) terms, would have to grow at 12% a year for the next 25 years straight to achieve the same size, which is already faster than its current 9-10% rate, if even that can be sustained for so long (no country, let alone a large one, has grown at more than 8% over such a long period). In other words, the progress that the US economy would make from 1945 to 2030 (85 years) would have to be achieved by China in just the 25 years from 2005 to 2030. Even then, this is just the total GDP, not per capita GDP, which would still be merely a fourth of America’s.

This is barmy. I wonder whether a further two years (the article was written in May 2006) has done to this sunny optimism. The US economy is essentially bankrupt and will significantly contract over the coming years; moreover the US dollar will continue it’s decline – gently if the Chinese are benign, harshly if the US embarks on some more foreign adventures. Have a look at this blog for more detail on all this (there are many others).

2) Create original consumer brands that are household names everywhere in the world (including in America), such as Coca-Cola, Nike, McDonalds, Citigroup, Xerox, Microsoft, or Google. Europe and Japan have created a few brands in a few select industries, but China currently has none. Observing how many American brand logos have populated billboards and sporting events in developing nations over just the last 15 years, one might argue that US dominance has even increased by this measure.

Brands as such are irrelevant, what matters is the underlying manufacturing capacity and ability. Brands are very much the icing on the cake – and at the moment the US has a lot of icing, China (and other countries) are making the cakes.

3) Have a military capable of waging wars anywhere in the globe (even if it does not actually wage any). Part of the opposition that anti-Americans have to the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is the envy arising from the US being the only country with the means to invade multiple medium-size countries in other continents and still sustain very few casualties. No other country currently is even near having the ability to project military power with such force and range. Mere nuclear weapons are no substitute for this. The inability of the rest of the world to do anything to halt genocide in Darfur is evidence of how such problems can only get addressed if and when America addresses them.

This is myopic. I’d recommend getting familiar with John Robb’s writings, and perhaps a little historical study, eg of the change in the balance of sea power from 1885 to 1910 after the invention of the dreadnoughts. Things can change very suddenly.

4) Have major universities that are household names, that many of the worlds top students aspire to attend. 17 of the world’s top 20 universities are in the US. Until top students in Europe, India, and even the US are filling out an application for a Chinese university alongside those of Harvard, Stanford, MIT, or Cambridge, China is not going to match the US in the knowledge economy. This also represents the obstacles China has to overcome to successfully conduct impactful scientific research.

Again, the description is both misleading and short-sighted. What are all the Chinese engineering graduates going to do with their expertise?

5) Attract the best and brightest to immigrate into China, where they can expect to live a good life in Chinese society. The US effectively receives a subsidy of $100 to $200 billion a year, as people educated at the expense of another nation immigrate here and promptly participate in the workforce. As smart as people within China are, unless they can attract non-Chinese talent that is otherwise going to the US, and even talented Americans, they will not have the same intellectual and psychological cross-pollination, and hence miss out on those economic benefits. The small matter of people not wanting to move into a country that is not a democracy also has to be resolved.

This touches on what I perceive as an enduring strength in US culture, ie that it is in moq terms a very dynamic and resilient one. However it seems to me that both US strength and Chinese weakness in this regard can be overemphasised, and is liable to rapid change. It is not totally outside the realms of speculation that in 2030 China might be a democracy of sorts (and a Christian one no less), whereas the US might have fragmented after another civil war.

6) Become the nation that produces the new inventions and corporations that are adopted by the mass market into their daily lives. From the telephone and airplane over a century ago, America has been the engine of almost all technological progress. Despite the fears of innovation going overseas, the big new technologies and influential applications continue to emerge from companies headquartered in the United States. Just in the last two years, Google emerged as the next super-lucrative company (before eBay and Yahoo slightly earlier), and the American-dominated ‘blogosphere’ emerged as a powerful force of information and media.

This is really a function of the underlying economic strength and so isn’t a separate point to #1.

7) Be the leader in entertainment and culture. China’s film industry greatly lags India’s, let alone America’s. We hear about piracy of American music and films in China, which tells us exactly what the world order is. When American teenagers are actively pirating music and movies made in China, only then will the US have been surpassed in this area. Take a moment to think how distant this scenario is from current reality.

This is a remarkably insular perspective. Bollywood is already bigger than Hollywood on many criteria.

8) Be the nation that engineers many of the greatest moments of human accomplishment. The USSR was ahead of the US in the space race at first, until President Kennedy decided in 1961 to put a man on the moon by 1969. While this mission initially seemed to be unnecessary and expensive, the optimism and pride brought to anti-Communist people worldwide was so inspirational that it accelerated many other forms of technological progress and brought economic growth to free-market countries. This eventually led to a global exodus from socialism altogether, as the pessimism necessary for socialism to exist became harder to enforce. People from many nations still feel pride from humanity having set foot on the Moon, something which America made possible. China currently has plans to put a man on the moon by 2024. While being only the second country to achieve this would certainly be prestigious, it would still be 55 years after the United States achieved the same thing. That is not quite the trajectory it would take to approach the superpowerdom of the US by 2030. If China puts a man on Mars before the US, I may change my opinion on this point, but the odds of that happening are not high.

Putting a man on the moon in 1969 may in retrospect be seen as the peak of US world dominance (not accidentally close in time to peak US oil production of course). There will be different peaks in different ages, and this isn’t an argument that China won’t be dominant in the 21st century in the way that the US was dominant in the 20th.

9) Be the nation expected to thanklessly use its own resources to solve many of the world’s problems. If the US donates $15 billion in aid to Africa, the first reaction from critics is that the US did not donate enough. On the other hand, few even consider asking China to donate aid to Africa. After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the fashionable question was why the US did not donate even more and sooner, rather than why China did not donate more, despite being geographically much closer. Ask yourself this – if an asteroid were on a collision course with the Earth, which country’s technology would the world depend on to detect it, and then destroy or divert it? Until China is relied upon to an equal degree, it is not in the same league.

This is describing a criterion of dominance (or parity) – it doesn’t advance an argument that China will not be able to meet the criterion.

10) Adapt to the underappreciated burden of superpowerdom – the huge double standards that a benign superpower must withstand in that role. America is still condemned for slavery that ended 140 years ago, even by nations that have done far worse things more recently than that. Is China prepared to apologize for Tianenmen Square, the genocide in Tibet, the 30 million who perished during the Great Leap Forward, and the suppression of news about SARS,every day for the next century? Is China remotely prepared for being blamed for inaction towards genocide in Darfur while simultaneously being condemned for non-deadly prison abuse in a time of war against opponents who follow no rules of engagement? The amount of unfairness China would have to withstand to truly achieve political parity with America might be prohibitive given China’s history over the last 60 years. Furthermore, China being held to the superpower standard would simultaneously reduce the burden that the US currently bears alone, allowing the US to operate with less opposition than it experiences today.

This is an adaptation of point #5 above.

My two pennies: I expect the world in 2030 to be multi-polar, and poised to enter a minor renaissance after some horrifically destructive conflict. I would expect the poles to be: a significantly diminished and chastened US, Brazil, the EU, India and China. I think the Middle East will be a ravaged wasteland; Russia will return to its 19th century status at best; and a possible sixth pole may be Southern Africa (with a nod to the late Arthur C Clarke).

A brief post on politics


Al raises a number of political points, which right now I don’t have the time to go into in great detail – though I have done before and will do again. For those interested in pursuing, this post is probably the clearest: Why I am a Conservative and what I mean by that.

For my views on poverty go here.
For my views on the right way to react to Islamist terrorism go here.

I would reiterate that at this moment in time my political stance is a fairly dark shade of green; I just don’t see that as eclipsing the traditional left/right classifications, and even if we do achieve a relocalised steady-state economy, those traditional political arguments will still be there.

Cloverfield, Obama and Islamists

I got woken up by one of the kids in the middle of the night a few days ago, and couldn’t get back to sleep. I was thinking about Cloverfield and the review I posted of it. Whilst I still think that it was dramatically flat, further reflection makes me wonder if it may function – possibly unwittingly – as a parable of the United States at this time.

What I have in mind is this: there is a clear invoking of 9/11 in Cloverfield, and the incomprehensible nature of the monster is quite a good proxy for the failure to understand Islamic terrorism. Here is a monster that is laying waste to Manhattan, causing the pyroclastic flow of ash to run down the city streets.

If the monster is terrorism, what is the response of the lead characters? (By the way, if I had been more emotionally invested in them, this would probably never have occurred to me.) Well, they play out a romantic script. This is not a monster movie where the hero saves the day. This is a monster movie where the hero tries to save the life of someone who was once his girlfriend. The hero is playing out a script, inculturated through a million love songs, about what is important and valuable in contemporary life. Choose life. Your identity is found in romantic engagement. All politics is corrupt, life-destroying and, worst of all, boring. So the only intelligible choice within this value system is: save the maybe-girlfriend. This has all sorts of nobility possible within it – but as a response to the devastation being wrought, it misses the point.

Which is why I wonder whether Cloverfield is a parable for the United States at the moment, most especially in the hopes swirling around Obama. Consider the video of ‘Yes we can’:

This is very moving, even inspiring. I think Obama is a gifted orator. It’s just that the sight of all the pop stars and pretty actresses exclaiming ‘yes we can’ is so reminiscent of the hero in Cloverfield choosing to rescue the maybe-girlfriend. This is not a cowardly choice but it is a choice which rather ignores the context of the monster flattening skyscrapers. It is also a choice which places the friends who follow into danger and ends up taking their lives. Not in order to slay the monster, but in order to preserve the integrity of the romantic ethos within which the hero is playing out his drama. It is not that the hero doesn’t care for, even love his friends. It is that the horizon for his choices doesn’t include the monster. It is not a factor in his thinking.

Whenever there is a time of stress there is a desire to avoid facing up to the nature of the problem. The United States is facing increasing stresses at the moment and it seems to me that Obama represents an avoidance of the existential issue. He is drawing on the rhetoric of hope and change. He looks the part: JFK (or maybe Bobby?) reincarnate, come to save the States from themselves. Someone who can redeem the people from their mistakes and make them feel better about themselves. And he seems to have integrity, not least through his consistent opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet that seems to be precisely the problem: Obama doesn’t recognise the existence of the monster.

The collapse of complex societies (Joseph Tainter)


I had been meaning to read this work for quite some time, as it has quite a high reputation in peak oil circles. In particular, it has been cited directly to me in contexts where I have disputed the inevitability of the collapse of our civilisation. Now that I have read it, I can see that the high reputation is definitely deserved, although I have drawn somewhat optimistic conclusions from it. Click ‘full post’ for text.

Summary of Tainter’s argument
Tainter’s work was originally published in 1988 and has the feel of a work which is establishing a new field of study. Tainter is concerned to explore what ‘collapse’ means, when applied to a society; how collapse happens; and, in the conclusion, to draw some possible lessons for our present situation. The first chapter is a swift survey of eighteen historical examples of collapsed societies around the world, from the Harappans to the Hohokams. This serves to introduce the field that Tainter wishes to study, and also indicates the absence of rigorous empirical investigation. This is the cue for Tainter to begin his systematic analysis. He outlines what is meant by ‘collapse’, describing it as “a matter of rapid substantial decline in an established level of complexity. A society that has collapsed is suddenly smaller, less differentiated and heterogeneous, and characterised by fewer specialised parts…” Then in chapter three, Tainter surveys the explanations commonly given for why a particular society collapses, finding them all more or less deficient, and saving an especial scorn for ‘mystical explanations’ (eg Spengler or Toynbee), about which he writes: “Mystical explanations fail totally to account scientifically for collapse. They are crippled by reliance on a biological growth analogy, by value judgements, and by explanation by reference to intangibles.” In the course of this chapter he also gives a resounding declaration of the benefit of excluding value-judgements: “A scholar trained in anthropology learns early on that such valuations are scientifically inadmissible, detrimental to the cause of understanding, intellectually indefensible, and simply unfair”. This reads rather quaintly today, not least if the arguments that Robert Pirsig advances about anthropology in Lila are anywhere near being correct. However, this doesn’t really impact upon Tainter’s project.

Tainter then takes the best existing explanation for collapse (economic) and proceeds to develop a hypothesis to explain why complex societies might suddenly shift from a more complex to a less complex state. His thesis can be concisely stated: increasing complexity gives rise to diminishing marginal returns on investment; when those returns become negative, the society has a progressively diminishing capacity to withstand stress, and is vulnerable to collapse.
Essentially at point C3 there is no benefit from the increase of complexity (C3-C1) – hence the collapse from C3 to C1.

This thesis is built upon four working assumptions:
– human societies are problem-solving organisations;
– sociopolitical systems require energy for their maintenance;
– increased complexity carries with it increased costs per capita; and
– investment in sociopolitical complexity as a problem-solving response often reaches a point of declining marginal returns.

What happens is that, as a complex society initially develops, there is a very high return on investment in complexity – the resources made available through that adoption of complexity are far higher than are used up through the complex organisation itself. However, over time, the ‘low hanging fruit’ are used up, and for every increase in complexity there is a lower and lower resource return until there comes a point where simply maintaining the existing complexity has a negative impact upon available resources – in other words, the resources are more efficiently deployed through a less complex system.

Tainter gives a number of different specific and small-scale examples where this decline in marginal returns applies, for example in terms of the return on research and development investment, or medical research, but his next chapter applies the theory to understanding three different examples of collapse. The most telling example, to my mind, was that of the farmers in the latter stages of the Western Roman Empire, who were taxed more and more heavily in order to maintain the apparatus of the Roman state, and who eventually welcomed the barbarian invasions as a release from what had become Roman oppression. A Roman structure of high complexity had been viable for as long as there were increasing resources made available – and this was accomplished through conquest. However, once the limits of conquest were reached (either with the German tribes, whose relative poverty made their conquest uneconomic, or through coming up against another Empire strong enough to resist Rome, eg the Parthian) then the model of development became untenable. The accumulated resources available to Rome were drawn down, its capacity to absorb shocks to the system was eroded, and thus the collapse of that form of complexity became a matter of time. As Tainter writes, “Once a complex society enters the stage of declining marginal returns, collapse becomes a mathematical likelihood, requiring little more than sufficient passage of time to make probable an insurmountable calamity”. As a complex society enters into this terminal phase, the advantages to retreating to a previously existing level of complexity become more and more obvious, and local communities start to shift their allegiance: “…a society reaches a state where the benefits available for a level of investment are no higher than those available for some lower level…Complexity at such a point is decidedly advantageous, and the society is in danger of collapse from decomposition or external threat”. The only way to avoid a collapse is for the society to access a new resource which increases the return on investment once more.

One intriguing aspect that Tainter draws out in his closing remarks is that collapse is only possible where there is a power vacuum. That is, in a situation of conflict between states collapse does not occur, there is simply a transfer of control from one polity to another, without any diminishment in levels of complexity. However, this does mean that when collapse happens it happens systemically across several different polities simultaneously.

Comments and questions
To this lay reader Tainter’s principal conclusions seem both sound and helpful. The idea that societies collapse into lower levels of complexity as a direct result of decreasing marginal returns on investment seems plausible, robust and open to various forms of empirical investigation. How far Tainter is correct in this thesis is something that professionals in his field can take forward. My interest is with the implications for our present crisis, for it seems unarguable that our existing society has entered the realm of diminishing returns on investment (seen most clearly through peak oil) and so I end with these various comments and questions.

– There seems to be a trade off between efficiency and resilience; that is, the most efficient forms of complexity are the most susceptible to a sudden collapse. In contrast, those that are less efficient have deeper levels of resilience. (This seems a good way to describe Dmitry Orlov’s comparison of the US and USSR.);

– the theme of diminishing returns on complexity appears to explain much of contemporary politics. In the UK for example we have seen a significant increase in the resources made available from the centre for the purposes of health care. This has had either no or negative benefits upon the health of the population. It would seem that the NHS has gone past the point of optimum complexity and is now ripe for a collapse into more local arrangements. One more piece of evidence confirming that Gordon Brown’s pathological centralising tendencies are a disaster;

– more broadly Tainter’s analysis is very encouraging for all those wishing to see a relocalisation of economies, especially with regard to food supply.

– in global terms, Tainter writes that “Collapse, if and when it comes again, will be global. No longer can any individual nation collapse. World civilisation will disintegrate as a whole.” It seems unarguable that our present form of industrial civilisation will collapse; what is not clear to me is whether it makes sense to equate ‘industrial civilisation’ with ‘technically advanced and humane civilisation’. In particular there seems no reason why it should not be possible to shift to a ‘steady-state’ type of economy;

– in this context I found Stuart Staniford’s 2050 scenario fascinating. What Staniford was outlining was one way in which a new energy subsidy (solar power) might be tapped in order to maintain the existing levels of complexity. I do not see the existing levels of complexity as desirable; just as the late-Roman farmers found it in their interest to let the central structures collapse, so too might the majority of the industrialised nations find it in their interest to let the gigantic state structures, built up through the twentieth century, collapse in turn. (The Shield of Achilles is relevant to this argument.);

– I would be very interested to read an analysis of Tainter that was also informed about the nature of contemporary capitalism, especially the nature of financial instruments. Much of the discourse about economics in peak oil circles seems at best incomplete, if not ignorant (especially talk about ‘fiat’ currencies). It seems to me that capitalism is a new development of the last few centuries, and that the financial resources made available, whilst not overcoming the problems Tainter outlines, do make the outcomes very different. This could apply in two ways: the present financial crisis may be more severe as a result of financial creativity, but it also may be possible to pull up an economy by its own bootstraps in ways that were not possible before. (See here for a related book review.)

So why have I come away from Tainter with an optimistic outlook? The answer is that Tainter makes plain that the collapse of complexity is not necessarily a universal bane. On the contrary, whilst those most closely invested in the centralised structures do badly in a collapse, it is quite possible that the majority of a community will benefit, not least because for a long time leading up to a collapse the maintenance of the status quo had exacted an increasing burden upon ordinary citizens. The removal of a particular level of human complexity does not, of itself, lead to depopulation. It seems quite possible that the twenty-first century future will be local, resilient and humane, and without an over-bearing state recklessly absorbing and wasting scarce resources that prospect seems very attractive. Of course, getting to that point will likely be very scary…